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About fifteen years ago, I began to explore the issue that has since become
known as racial profiling: police use of racial or ethnic appearance as one factor
among others in deciding which drivers or pedestrians seemed suspicious enough
to stop, question, and search. Like others who had worked in the criminal justice
system-I had been a criminal defense attorney and (more briefly) had worked in a
prosecutor's office before entering the legal academy-I had heard many times
that police commonly based traffic stops and searches on racial or ethnic criteria,
and had heard countless anecdotes from friends, acquaintances, and clients about
this issue. Since there were no statistics kept on any regular basis by law
enforcement agencies that might either confirm or deny whether any such pattern
actually existed, the public debate over the issue in the early 1990s consisted
largely of assertions and counter-assertions-a war of allegations and stories.
On the one hand, members of communities of color contended that police
stops while driving-often for minor equipment infractions or trivial moving
violations-happened to them with a frequency much greater than either their
presence on the road as drivers or their driving behavior seemed to justify. Even
more disturbing, they alleged, these stops often came accompanied by requests for
consent to search their cars. For their part, police contended either that this was
not happening, or that even if blacks and Latinos did experience disproportionate
rates of vehicle stops and searches, this activity helped law enforcement catch
greater percentages of criminals for their efforts. The debate seemed at a
stalemate. There were two sets of narratives-people of color experiencing
discriminatory enforcement versus police agencies using a legitimate marker of
greater probability of criminal involvement-that competed with each other.
Then came the work of John Lamberth, then of Temple University, in
lawsuits in Maryland' and New Jersey. Lamberth used statistical tools to measure
the frequency of police stops of white and black drivers, and compared this stop
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information to the presence of each group on the road. His results changed the
national conversation. At least in the locations in which he had conducted his
measurements, state police were stopping blacks at many times the rate one would
expect, given their presence on the road, and the driving behavior of blacks did not
account for the difference. This prompted me to make my first foray into the use
of the tools of criminology for the purpose of exploring issues of criminal
procedure. I proposed that Congress enact legislation that would mandate
collection of ten relevant pieces of data, including the race of the driver, on each
traffic stop made by any police department receiving federal funds. This
suggestion, presented to the yearly meeting of the Congressional Black Caucus and
later published in an article in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,3
became the basis for the first legislative proposal on the subject at any level of
government: the Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997,4 introduced by Rep. John
Conyers.
In subsequent work, 5 1 used simple data-driven arguments to demonstrate that
using race or ethnicity in deciding whom to stop, question, and search did not, in
fact, boost the effectiveness of police enforcement efforts. In fact, it seemed to
push police success rates down instead of lifting them. This downward pressure
on what I called "hit rates" seemed counterintuitive, but study after study
supported this insight. This result, like Lamberth's statistics showing that racial
profiling was real and measurable, changed the debate again. No longer would the
claim that using racial profiling constituted effective police work go unchallenged.
All of this lifted the issue into the first rank of national concerns, to the point
that after he won the disputed 2000 election, George W. Bush spoke before a joint
session of Congress for the first time and declared that racial profiling is "wrong[,]
[and] [w]e must end it [in America]." 6
For me, my work on the racial profiling issue marked the beginning of my use
of criminology in my scholarship and my embrace of the field and its methods as a
way to help me understand, explain, and explore questions of criminal procedure.
Certainly I was not the first to do this. I simply offer my story as a way of
illustrating how one person, looking for ways to break through a rhetorical and
legal impasse, found in criminology a new and highly effective approach.
I claim no great expertise in criminology, and I am fully aware that the
methods I have used in my work do not approach any great level of sophistication.
I am almost entirely self-taught; for almost all of the mistakes I have managed to
avoid in my criminology-based work, I owe a great debt to John Lamberth, who
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has served as a patient, kind, and learned mentor to me. Nevertheless, the tools of
criminology have transformed the way I look at my areas of study and research,
and I believe they can do the same for many others.
That thought became the genesis for this special issue of The Ohio State
Journal of Criminal Law. Given my own experiences, I had always wanted a
chance to explore what criminology might do for others laboring in the same area
of the law; thus, the theme of this issue, What Criminal Law and Procedure Can
Learn from Criminology. I am delighted to present the reader with four articles
that will discuss the uses that scholars of criminal law and procedure can make of
criminology to bring important insights to our field.
The issue begins with a piece by Richard Leo of the University of San
Francisco and Jon Gould of George Mason University. Both Professors Leo and
Gould have produced first-rank work in criminology. Their article, Studying
Wrongful Convictions: Learning from Social Science, illustrates the theme of this
special issue perfectly. Professors Leo and Gould begin by observing the upsurge
of legal scholarship on wrongful convictions over the past ten years, but they note
that very little of this work has reflected collaboration between legal scholars and
criminologists. They then show the potential for such collaboration by using the
empirical study of wrongful convictions as an example, arguing that the methods
of criminology (and social science generally) will allow us to understand the
causes of wrongful convictions because of the capacity of these approaches to give
us more precise and accurate descriptions of how things happen. According to Leo
and Gould, using these techniques will help scholars of criminal law and procedure
to attain a clearer understanding of "the causes, characteristics, and consequences
' 8
of wrongful convictions than does the usual narrative approach utilized in legal
scholarship.
Professor Eric Miller of Saint Louis University School of Law takes a
somewhat different tack. In Putting the Practice into Theory,9 Professor Miller
surveys two views of the criminal procedure universe: the familiar rights-based
conception, which centers on the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court, and a regulatory view of criminal procedure. The latter, he argues, may
have much more to do with how criminal procedure actually functions. But more
importantly, the Supreme Court often includes assumptions about the regulatory
context in which criminal procedure operates. Modem criminal procedure at the
Supreme Court level, Miller argues, "rests upon a variety of untested regulatory
assumptions about the ways in which the police do and ought to interact with the
public."10 These assumptions, often fundamental to or even determinative of the
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outcomes of Supreme Court cases, are nevertheless "fictional, meaning that they
lack any basis in descriptive criminology or social science."" Professor Miller
argues that those of us in the legal academy involved in the study of criminal law
and procedure must begin to examine what he calls "the criminological evidence"'
2
to see whether and how it strengthens or weakens the Supreme Court's
assumptions.
Professor Erik Luna of Washington and Lee School of Law takes a contrarian
approach to the question.' 3  Though criminology offers considerable help to
scholars of criminal law and procedure, it has limits. He prefers that criminal law
and procedure make greater use of literary and cultural materials. This type of
work, Luna says, can inspire the human imagination in ways that law and
criminology simply cannot, helping to raise important questions that studies of law
and statistics will not reach. Professor Luna uses the "narrative of fear"'14 after the
events of September 11, 2001, as an example of a set of legal and cultural events
that might have been positively impacted by paying attention to literature,
particularly dystopian fiction. This work might have helped to raise important
questions of authoritarian abuses by the government that the law did little to stop.
Last, I offer a piece of my own, How Accountability-Based Policing Can
Reinforce-Or Replace-The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule,15 as an
example of how criminology can guide one's work and help to pose questions that
add depth to both the topics explored and to the solutions to problems we discover.
In Hudson v. Michigan,'6 the Supreme Court came within one vote of discarding
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. One reaction to Hudson might be that
the exclusionary rule would soon disappear, and we should explore what legal
regime might, or should, replace it. But an important piece of criminology
scholarship that preceded Hudson by just two years, co-authored by Professor
Gould, caused me to broaden my research questions. Certainly we needed to ask
what, if anything, should replace the exclusionary rule should the rule disappear,
but we also needed to notice that, should the rule not disappear, it needed major
shoring up if it was to continue to function as envisioned. Put another way, the
Supreme Court might overturn the rule, but whether it does or not, the rule in its
current state is not functioning well as a deterrent to constitutional violations, and
so new measures would be needed either way. In the article, I recommend looking
to the advances made in the field of police accountability, in which the work has
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been done not by legal scholars but has been completed by criminologists,
particularly Professor Emeritus Samuel Walker of the University of Nebraska. '
7
I hope the reader will gain as much from studying this issue of the Journal as
I have from putting it together and working with these wonderful authors. I thank
the Journal and its guiding force, Joshua Dressler, the Frank R. Strong Professor in
Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, for the opportunity to
serve as guest editor. Joshua, one of the greatest pleasures of undertaking this
project has been the chance to work with and learn from you.
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17 See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2005); SAMUEL
WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990
(1993).

